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HUGH II. WU.~LIAM 
ATI\Tl\S ct 
[1] Negligence-Questions of Law and Fact--Res Ipsa Loquitur.-
It is ordinarily a for the fact finder, first, whether 
facts which give rise to the res loquitur inference of 
neg·ligence actually exist and, second, if the inference arises, 
whether it prevails or is overcome. 
[2] Id.-Res Ipsa Loquitur-Control of Instrumentality.-An es-
sential element which plaintiff must establish before the res 
ipsa loquitur inference will arise is that defendant had ex-
clusiYe control of the the injury or, if he had 
relinquished control, that the instrumentality had not been 
improprrly handled by some third person or its condition other-
wise changed after control was relinquished defendant. 
[3] Id.-Res Ipsa Loquitur-Burden of Proof.-Plaintiff has the 
burden of establishing the elements whieh application 
of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine. 
Automobiles-Res Ipsa Loquitur.-Where a truck rolled down-
grade and struck a cafe some minutes after it had been left 
the driver to be checked a mechanic, and the trial court 
impliedly found that the truck was securely parked with the 
brakes locked and the front wheels headed away from the 
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recover for personal sustained 
when a as the result of negligence of the 
driver, defendant Atkins, rolled into a cafe plaintiffs operated. 
\Ve have concluded that plaintiffs' contention that by reason 
of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine negligence of the driver was 
established as a matter of law, is without merit, and that the 
judgment should be affirmed. 
From the record it appears that at about 8 :30 on an evening 
in October, 1952, a truck being driven by defendant Atkins, 
as the employe of defendants Bischel and belonging to defend-
ant Insured Transport, Inc., developed motor trouble. Atkins 
pulled off the highway and stopped the truck at the \Vheeler 
Ridge Garage. At the garage he asked a methanic, McElyea, 
to look at the motor, while he, Atkins, went to a nearby cafe 
to telephone to his employer. Atkins, who then left the truck 
while the mechanic was checking the engine, testified that at 
that time he had the equipment in double low gear with the 
vacuum brakes on and the mechanieal hand emergency brake 
set. In Atkins' six to eight years of experience as a truck 
driver there is no more effective way to apply braking power 
on sueh equipment, and it was parked in a safe manner. 
Atkins then walked some 250 feet to the cafe, which plaintiffs 
operated, and wa,; making his telephone calls when the truck 
struck the cafe building; about seven to nine minutes had 
elapsed since he had left the truck. During a part of that 
time the mechanic was working in or about the truck. Atkins 
had been driving this particular rig about two and one-half 
months and had had no previous brake trouble; on the day 
of the accident he had applied the brakes many times, always 
successfully. 'When he parked the truck, after being told by 
the mechanic that "it would be all right to set the truck 
there,'' both the truck and the front wheels were facing 
The 
testified as a 'witness 
the truck to go to the cafe 
the brakes -vvere on and Atkins 
Atkins said that he would make a 
come back and "we \Yould cheek it out more"; that the wit-
ness spent another two to minutes at the motor, 
during which time he did not "have the motor running," 
and then fOllowed Atkins to the and had ordered 
or was about to order coffee when the truck struck the build-
ing; that the witness then went outside and looked into 
the cab of the truck and determined that the transmission 
was in gear as to one gear box although he had not looked 
inside the cab before going to the cafe; that he did not look 
at more than one gear box; that the ''general lay of the land 
in the vicinity of where the truck stopped'' is such that 
"(h(ite a think it 'is level there ... The grade is very 
deceiving" (italics added); that some tnwk drivers use blocks 
under the whe(']s when tlwy stop there and some do not, and 
the witness d·id not ca·t.dion Atlc1:ns to t~se blocks on this 
occasion, no1· did he himself put blocks 1l11der the truck be-
fore he left it to go to the eafe; that the truck was "absolutely 
dead stationary" when the witness left it and had been 
stationaTy for at least two to four minutes after Atkins hacl 
stoppccl the motoT; that he did not remember whether at the 
time he left the truck and went to the cafe there v;ere any 
other people in the general area, although commonly there are 
people "around there all hours of the night." 
The trial court found that it '>Vas not true that Atkins 
negligently handled the truck and proximately caused the 
accident. Plaintiffs contend, however, that the accident was 
"unexplained" and that because it was unexplained the res 
ipsa loquitur doctrine applies and thereby establishes Atkins' 
negligence as a matter of law, while defendants urge that 
the doctrine does not apply as them because the truck 
was under the control of the mechanic rather than of Atkins 
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a inference 
[2] The essential elements which 
establish before the inference will arise have often 
and include the that defendant had ex-
clusive control of the thing the injury or, if he had 
then a showing that the instrumentality 
had not been improperly handled by some third person or 
its condition otherwise changed after control was relin-
defendant. v. She1·win 1Villiarns Co. (1954), 
691~692 [268 P.2d 1041]; Zentz v. Coca 
Co. 39 Cal.2d 436, 444 [6] r247 P.2d 
; Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. , 24 Cal.2d 
457 P.2d 436] .) 
'l'he evidence in this case, as above noted, shows that the 
defendant Atkins, had left the truck, in double low 
gear and with the brakes locked, in the care of the mechanic 
.McElyea, who wns the motor, a]1(1 that Atkins had 
himself been absent from the truck for seven to nine minutes 
before the accident occurred. Dnring a substantial portion 
of that time lVIcElyea was on or about the truck. 
[3] Plaintiffs, who have the burden of establishing the ele-
ments which permit applieation of the res ipsa loquitur doc-
McElyea as their witness. His testimony 
was not binding on defendants. [4] I1'rom the facts that 
McElyea was not named as a party defendant and was in 
sense an interested party on plaintiffs' behalf and, in his 
adverse to the court could well 
part of the accident, 
insofar aB credible was was what hap-
pened to the truck after Atkins had left it in McElyea's care. 
That the court could well have believed, as it impliedly 
did, that Atkins' explanation of his own conduct was fully 
and excluded negligence on his part but that 
either it was unacceptable, and 
act of the latter was actually the sole proximate 
cause of the or that it was accrptable and indicated 
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that the act of unidentified person must have intervened 
and caused the accident. As McElyea himself 
testified that he was aware of the that it was "very 
deceiving,'' but that he did not caution defendant Atkins 
concerning or himself blocks under the wheels, and 
that he left the truck unattended commonly there 
were people ''around hours of the '' Since 
McElyea was asked to attention to the motor trouble 
and was trying to ''check it out'' it would seem reasonable 
that he might to start the motor; he had asked Atkins, as 
the latter started for the if the brakes were on. If he 
tried to start it, it wouM br reasonable to disengage the gears. 
Since the trial court impliedly found that the truck was 
securely parked with the brakes locked and with the front 
wheels headed away from the cafe building when Atkins left 
it, but rolled away and turned toward the building only after 
McElyea had given it his attention and then left it unattended, 
it would be logical to conclude that McElyea or some un-
identified person must have changed its condition, and that 
the res ipsa loquitur doctrine ·was not applicable as against 
defendants. 
[5] If, however, the trial court did conclude that facts 
existed which gave rise to the res ipsa inference, neverthe-
less, as commented in Druzanich v. Oriley (1942), Stlpra, 
19 Cal.2d 439,444 [4] [122 P.2d 53], that doctrine even where 
applicable does not give a plaintiff an absolute right to a 
judgment in every case, and when the defendant produces 
evidence to rebut the inference of negligence it is ordinarily 
a question of fact whether the inference has the greater 
weight, or is evenly balanced, or has been dispelled or over-
come. [6] Thus, in Scott v. Bm·ke (1952), 39 Cal.2d 388, 
398-401 [247 P.2d 313], it was held that the presumptions 
of due eare and innocenee (Code Civ. Pro e., § 1963, subds. 
1, 4) may be weighed by the fact finder and eonstitute suffi-
cient evidence to support a finding that the res ipsa loquitur 
inference has been overeome, and that "it is the function 
of the trier of facts to determine in the light of all the evidence 
in the case, including the opposing inferences and presump-
tions, whether the proof preponderates in favor of one party 
and against another, or is balaneed, and thereupon to 
resolve the issues in aceordance with the rules relating to the 
burden of proof." (P. 399 of 39 Cal.2d.) 
[7] Thus even though we assume that the court eould 
have concluded here, as in the Scott case, that the cause of 
Nov. 333 
the accident remained 
of both Atkins and the '"~'"'"'"'"v· 
doctrine. Atkins' 
left the truck in care of the 
meehanic it was in suc·h a and was so headed that 
"if the wheel had not been turned" it ·would not 
have collided with the cafe eveu if: it rolled ahead, and that 
it was in "double low gear," "the combination making the 
compression most '' and with both meehanical and 
vacuum brakes on and locked, coupled 1vith testimony of the 
mechanic that the truck had remained "absolutely dead sta-
tionary" for several minutes after Atkins had stopped the 
motor and before the mec·.hanic had himself left the truck 
completely unattended, and that following the accident the 
mechanic had looked at one gear box and determined that as 
to it the transmission >vas in gear, and the further facts 
that the mechanic was not named as a defendant but instead 
testified on behalf of plaintiffs, obviously provide evidence 
sufficient to support the trial court's finding that Atkins 
was free from negligenee proximately causing the aecident. 
Price v. McDonald (1935), 7 Cal.App.2d 77, 81 [45 P.2d 
425], and Harlow v. Standard hnp. Co. (1904), 145 Cal. 
477 [78 P. 1045}, eited by plaintiffs, involve the applicability 
of the res ipsa doctrine in providing supporting evidence for 
judgments for plaintiffs and are not in point where, as here, 
sufficiency of the evidence to judgment for de· 
fendants is the matter at issue. 
Plaintiffs further suggest that the findings as to their 
damages are eontradictory in that, aceording to plaintiffs' 
construction, the eourt found both that plaintiffs suffered no 
damages and that eertain damage inflicted upon the cafe 
building was caused to be repaired. 'Without reriting the 
findings in detaiL it is apparent that the finding that plaintiffs 
suffered no damages referred to damages proximately re-
sulting from ncgligenee of the defendants. Further, the 
finding, also attaeked by plaintiffs, that plaintiffs were guilty 
of misrepresentation which induced defendants to cause the 
building to be repaired in such a manner as to enhance its 
value in excess of $2,800 is immaterial in view of the finding 
J.-I dissent. 
The basis for the 
loquitur is found in ihe 
kinds of accidents do not occur in the absenee 
conduet the person in eontrol of the 
ing the accident. A of the oeeurrenee of 
then, raises an inferenee that the one in control 
was negligent and it becomes incumbent upon him to satis-
factorily explain the cause of the in order to avoid 
liability (Burr v. Sherw-in lVilliams 42 Cal.2d 682, 691 
[268 P.2d 1041] ). 
An examination of the faets in this case shows that they 
are particularly susceptible to the application of the res ipsa 
loquitur doctrine. 'l'he defendant Atkins, left the 
truck, which weighed several tons, unattended while he went 
to a cafe. The uncontradicted testimony of the mechanic, 
not a party to the shows that the eondition of the truck 
was not after Atkins left. A few minutes after 
Atkins left the scene, the truck crashed through the side of 
the cafe which was some 250 feet downgrade from where the 
truck was parked. Clearly, parked vehicles do not roll down-
hill unless the operator was negligent, either in parking the 
vehicle or in maintaining its braking equipment in proper 
mechanical order. v. 7 Cal.App.2cl 77 [ 45 
P.2d 425] .) The first question that arises, then, is whether 
the trier of fact can refuse to draw the infcrenee that Atkins 
was negligent. In discussing this problem in Burr v. Sherwin 
Williams supra, this court said at page 689 that "In 
some types of situations, because of the nature of the par-
ticular accident, an inference of negligence upon the part 
of the defendant may be so strong that no reasonable man 
eould fail to aecept it in the absenec of explanatory evidence.'' 
Put another \Yay, " ... if the inferenee is suffieiently strong 
to persuade the and the obvious conelnsion that the 
defendant has been negligent, no perverse should be 
permitted to refuse to draw it. If the thing speaks for it-
an inference which is 




" and this inference 
<ea.ov'«"J'"' man could fail to it." 
also examined in Bur1· v 
at page where Mr. Chief 
for a unanimous court, said that 
tr·ier fact may as it sees fit, even though 
the defendant offers no rrhis view, 
1vhich is inconsistent with most of the California decisions, 
very difficult to apply, and there are snbstantial reasons 
we should hold that in every type of res ipsa loquitur 
case the defendant should have the bnrden of meeting the 
inference of negligence .... 
"It is our conclusion that in all r-e.~ ipsa loqnit n1· situations 
fhe defendant must present evidence sufficient to meet or 
halance the of neuligcnce, and that the Jurors should 
be insfrnctecl that, if the defendant fails to do so, they should 
the " (Emphasis added.) 
In regard to what a defendant must show in order to meet 
the burden imposed by the inference of neg1igence, the court 
in Talbert v. Osteruaard, 129 Cal.App.2d 222, 228 [276 P.2d 
8801, said: "Procedurally, it is incumbent on defendant to 
rebut the inference a ' "either (J of a sa tis-
explanation of the accirlent, that an affirmative 
of a definite canse for the aecident, in which cause 
no rlemrnt of negligenee on the part of the defendant inheres, 
of such care in all possible as necessarily to 
lead to the conc1nsion that the accident conld not have hap-
from want of care, but must have been dne to some 
(~anse, alt1wng-h the exact eam;e is unknown. 
the latter case, inasmneh as the process of reasoning is one 
the eare slwwn must be in the sense 
it covers al1 causes wl1irh due care on the of the 
(tefendant might haYe preYentrd.'' ' v. Providence 
31 Cal.2d 290. 295 P.2r1 121.) In short, the 
which the defendant is to make is an 
[47 0.2d 
it must be as 
67 Cal.App.2d 
the sufficiency 
aeddent or the sufficiency 
of fact for the 
the 
Applying these standards abundantly elear 
that defendant has not offered evidence suffieient to overcome 
the inference of there was no ex-
planation of the cause of the accident. It appears equally 
obvious that there is insuffic-ient evidence of "due care in all 
possible respeets. '' Defendant's explanation is that he 
left the gears engaged and the brake locked. This does not 
amount to "an explanation as broad as the inference." Ex-
cept for th mechanic's testimony that one of the gear boxes 
was in gear (no braking power would be afforded unless 
both gears 1vere engaged), there was no evidence as to the con-
dition of the gears and brakes after the accident. Such evi-
dence would certainly be of assistanee in determining the 
cause of and responsibility for the accident, and, presumably, 
such evidence was within defendant's power to produce as 
he drove the truek after the accident. Yet, no snch evidence 
was offered. Under similar circmnstances, it was said in 
Tnlbcrt v. Ostergaard, snp1·a, at page 229, that "'l'he failure 
of a defendant to produce evidence explaining a circum-
stance of importance in the ease, if such evidence is available, 
justifies an inference that such evidence, if given, would re-
dound to his prejudice. [ 'fhis principle applies 
with particular foree where, as here, the circumstance to be 
explained arises in relation to defendant's burden of meeting 
an inference of negligence.'' The only conelnsion, then, that 
can be drawn is that defendant has not done all within his 
power to explain the aeeident and, therefore, it should be held 
that he has failed to overcome the inference of negligence. 
For these reasons, I would reverse the judgment. 
